[Kammy]

"- There is evidence that a situation similar to Wisconsin’s exists or existed at Tulane University in New Orleans, Louisiana, which also does not have appropriate labs for such research. Tulane officials refused a half dozen requests to clarify the research, again with Ebola cDNAs as well as constructs for Lassa fever virus, another BSL-4 hemorrhagic fever agent;

- At the University of Texas at Austin in April 2006, human error and equipment (centrifuge) malfunction combined in an incident in a BSL-3 lab handling potentially very dangerous genetically-engineered crosses between H5N1 “bird flu” and typical (H3N2) human influenza.

The researcher was placed on drugs, the lab shut down and decontaminated. The University did not report the incident to the federal government and has since produced conflicting accounts of what exactly happened;

- In mid-2003, a University of New Mexico (UNM) researcher was jabbed with an anthraxladen needle. The following year, another UNM researcher experienced a needle stick with an unidentified (redacted) pathogenic agent that had been genetically engineered;

- At the Medical University of Ohio, in late 2004 a researcher was infected with Valley Fever (Coccidioides immitis), a BSL-3 biological weapons agent. The following summer (2005), a serious lab accident occurred that resulted in exposure of one or more workers to an aerosol of the same agent;

- In mid-2005, a lab worker at the University of Chicago punctured his or her skin with an infected instrument bearing a BSL-3 biological weapons agent. It was likely a needle contaminated with either anthrax or plague bacteria;

- In October and November of 2005, the University of California at Berkeley received dozens of
samples of what it thought was a relatively harmless organism. In fact, the samples contained
Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever bacteria, classified as a BSL-3 bioweapons agent because of its
potential for transmission by aerosol. As a result, the samples were handled without adequate
safety precautions until the mistake was discovered. Unlike nearby Oakland Children's Hospital,
which previously experienced a widely reported anthrax bacteria mixup, UC Berkeley never told
the community;

In addition to lab-acquired infections and exposures, other types of dangerous problems have
occurred, such as unauthorized research, equipment malfunction, and disregard for safety
protocols:

- In February 2005 at the University of Iowa, researchers performed genetic engineering
experiments with tularemia bacteria without permission. They included mixing genes from
tularemia species and introducing antibiotic resistance;

- In September 2004 at the University of Illinois at Chicago, lab workers at a BSL-3 facility
propped open doors of the lab and its anteroom, a major violation of safety procedures. An alarm
that should have sounded did not;

- In March 2005 at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, lab workers were exposed to
tuberculosis when the BSL-3 lab's exhaust fan failed. Due to deficiencies in the lab, a blower
continued to operate, pushing disease-laden air out of a safety cabinet and into the room. An
alarm, which would have warned of the problem, had been turned off. The lab had been
inspected and approved by the US Army one month earlier;

- In December 2005 at the Albert Einstein College of Medicine at Yeshiva University in New
York City, three lab workers were exposed (seroconverted) to the tuberculosis bacterium
following experiments in a BSL-3 lab. The experiments involved a Madison Aerosol Chamber,
the same device used in the February 2006 experiments that resulted in the Texas A&M brucella
case;

- In mid-2004, a steam valve from the biological waste treatment tanks failed at Building 41A on
the NIH Campus in Bethesda, Maryland. The building houses BSL-3 and BSL-4 labs. Major
damage was caused, and the building was closed for repairs;

- In April 2007, a centrifuge problem exposed several lab workers at the University of Texas
Health Science Center in Houston to anthrax;

- Also in April 2007, three lab workers entered a laboratory studying tularemia at the University
of Texas at San Antonio to repair faulty air filters. The workers did not wear respiratory
protection and handled the filter equipment without gloves."